A general consensus in the transition economies literature links the existence of enterprise restructuring with the pace of the transition process and the potential for economic growth. The existing literature is less clear, however, about whether the lack of economic growth is caused by the lack of enterprise restructuring. Complicating the debate in Russia is the confusion regarding the role of barter transactions in enterprise restructuring. Much of the confusion is generated by proponents of a "virtual economy" interpretation of how the Russian economy and Russian enterprise managers operate. This paper dispels much of the confusion about the existence of enterprise restructuring and the corresponding role of barter by demonstrating why the virtual economy model fails to accurately depict economic actions or outcomes in Russia. We develop the argument that barter is closely related to an absence of liquidity in the Russian economy, using both macro-level and micro-level data to document the consequences of "structural illiquidity." Our results are unambiguous: both the incidence and volume of barter transactions are inversely related to liquidity. We conclude that analyses using barter transactions as evidence of the lack of enterprise restructuring in Russia stem from: (1) the lack of clear consensus about what constitutes enterprise restructuring in transition economies and how it varies with the stage of the transition process; (2) errant assumptions about managers' objective functions; (3) the relative mix of formal and informal restructuring mechanisms; (4) the lack of attention to industry variation and, within industry, to managerial characteristics; and (5) the Texan complex (if it ain't big, it ain't ...) which causes analysts to ignore changes in enterprise operations unless they occur on a grandiose scale.
Introduction
Almost three years of positive economic growth following the financial collapse in 1998 have failed to dispel widespread pessimism concerning Russia's transition to a market economy. Although the most recent reports from Russia are far more positive than they have been throughout the ten years of transition 1 -investment growth rather than increasing consumer demand is driving the expansion, for example -each positive assessment of Russia's economic performance is matched by an equal number of pessimistic reports. 2 This is hardly surprising, given the scope of change required to establish a market economy in Russia and the uneven pace of development across various economic, political, and social dimensions.
However, while articles in the popular press are now more optimistic concerning the relative success of Russia's transition to a market-oriented economy, current scholarly research on the Russian economy, especially research which focuses on the performance of domestic industry, tends to be decidedly negative concerning Russia's long term economic prospects for sustained development. 3 The negativism stems in large part from perceptions that Russian manufacturing enterprises are not actively restructuring their operations. 4 Evidence of the lack of restructuring is offered in the form of the volume of barter and other non-monetary forms of payment made by former state-owned firms in Russia (see Table 1 ), as well as by the persistence of wage and tax arrears across most branches of Russian industry. other transition economies. 6 The existing literature is less clear, however, about whether the lack of economic growth is caused by the lack of enterprise restructuring. Ickes and Ericson (1999) categorize the literature on poor economic performance in Russia into two schools of thought: those that view poor economic performance as the consequence of "bad policy" and those who focus on "bad structure." While the authors acknowledge the policy mistakes of the Yeltsin era, they consider structural defects as the primary, and more serious, problem to be addressed by analysts and policy makers. Collectively, they refer to 4 The importance of enterprise restructuring in Russia's transition process was underscored by numerous studies documenting the technological backwardness of Soviet industry (Amann and Cooper 1986 , Berliner 1976 , Leary and Thornton 1989 , Linz 1993 , Thornton and Linz 1988 , as well as by the general recognition that location and productmix decisions in the Soviet centrally planned economy were politically motivated (firms located in regions to reward local political officials or to avoid invasion), with little regard to natural economic advantage (proximity to natural resources, for example) ( Frydman and Rapaczynski 1997 , Gregory and Stuart 1986 , Krueger 1993 , Linz 1988 . 5 Pinto et al (2000) are not alone in their conclusions that "virtual absence of serious enterprise restructuring" in Russia is driven by the "persistence of ... soft budget constraints for enterprises" (p. 298); that is, a firm's ability to acquire energy and other inputs without full payment is taken as prima facie evidence of the lack of restructuring. Hendley et al (1997) argue that barter allows firms to sustain socialist production patterns and thus refrain from restructuring. 6 Much of this literature is summarized in Djankov and Murrell (2000) , Gonchar and Wulf (1998) , Linz and Krueger (1998) , and Sedaitis (2000) .
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3 these distortions, most of which were inherited as part of the Soviet legacy, as contributing to Russia's "virtual economy" (Gaddy and Ickes 1998) .
Fundamental to the "virtual economy" hypothesis (VEH) is the assumption that the primary objective of enterprise managers is to avoid serious restructuring. The argument that managers seek to avoid restructuring is based on the assumption that the primary asset which "red executives" 7 possessed was their "network capital." That is, managers' idiosyncratic knowledge of contacts in the power hierarchy and/or the supply chain allowed them to "prosper" under the old system. Assuming that this specific knowledge is managers' primary asset, understandably, managers are reluctant to devalue it by restructuring the operations or production assortment of their firms. Restructuring, in the "virtual economy" model, is avoided by artificially inflating the balance sheets of poorly performing (value-subtracting) firms, shielding them from bankruptcy and other pressures to change their operations or production assortment (Gaddy and Ickes 1998) .
Proponents of the "virtual economy" thesis argue that Russian firms engage in economy-wide deception that "creates" value where none exists in reality. 8 The instruments through which this deception is effected include widespread use of barter and other quasi-money instruments of exchange, and an apparently permanent level of arrears in payments to workers and suppliers, as well as to federal and local tax authorities.
Proponents of the "virtual economy" thesis explain the existence of barter, payment arrears, and other forms of quasi-money by the underlying structural micro-foundations of the Russian economy, and not the consequence of "bad policies" -for example, excessively tight monetary policy leading to low levels of liquidity in the non-financial sector.
In this paper we present an alternative explanation: managers of formerly state-owned firms do consciously seek to restructure their firms and develop normally, but they are fundamentally constrained in their restructuring abilities by low levels of liquidity in the economy. Support for this proposition is found in the response patterns of Russian managers to questions which focus on the desirability and possibility of avoiding non-monetary transactions. The Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET) in Moscow surveyed over one thousand Russian manufacturing firms in 1999 and 2000, asking whether they would like to and whether they could avoid non-monetary transactions. As seen in Table 2 , more than 90% of the firms in the electric energy, ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, engineering (machine tools and instrument making, for example), construction materials and food industries responded affirmatively in 1999 to the desirability of avoiding non-monetary transactions. A similar response pattern holds for the following year. These data suggest that barter and other non-monetary transactions are imposed by circumstance. Moreover, when asked whether they could avoid such transactions, in all but food processing, less than 50 percent of the manufacturing firms participating in the survey reported being able to do so. That a significant share of firms engage in barter transactions, despite reporting themselves as able to avoid them, indicates that barter and other non-monetary transactions facilitate or enhance the firms' operations.
9
In Russia's liquidity-constrained environment, barter and other non-monetary payments perform an important function in the transition process: until capital markets develop and contract enforcement is assured, barter and other non-monetary payments permit the continued survival of potentially viable firms.
10
9 Linz and Noguera (2002) demonstrate that barter enables a firm to produce a higher level of output than would be possible if transactions are restricted to cash.
10 For further discussion, see Brana and Maurel (2000) , Desai and Goldberg (2000) , and .
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We do not suggest that the travails of Russia's economic transition have been simply the result of bad (macro) policies. Rather, we argue that "structural illiquidity" 11 in the Russian economy is symptomatic of a deeply-rooted structural problem in the financial sector, not in the restructuring behavior of Russian managers. In our analysis, the fundamental problem lies with the Russian banking sector's unwillingness to lend to Russian industry at competitive interest rates for periods longer than a few months' duration. Failure to address this problem impedes the nascent progress of Russia's transition to a fully-functioning market economy.
Empirical Challenges to the Virtual Economy Hypothesis
Despite the compelling argument put forth by proponents of the "virtual economy" hypothesis (VEH),
we find the VEH incomplete in explaining several phenomena of the Russian economy. One empirical prediction of the assumption that managers seek to preserve their network capital via the use of quasi-money is that the overall level of quasi-money in the economy would remain relatively stable through time. 12 Monthly data on the incidence of barter in Russia's transition economy (see Figure 1 ) indicate a high variance over time in the use of quasi-money: barter accounted for a low level of total transactions in the early 1990s, peaked in 1998 and began to decrease after the 1998 financial collapse. We examine alternative explanations for this observed pattern of barter transactions, identifying two actors that account for a large fraction of the variance: the real value of Russia's currency, the ruble, and the world market price of oil. 11 We acknowledge Vladimir Popov for suggesting this phrase. 
Source: Russian Economic Barometer and Institute for Economy in Transition (IET).13
Second, if the "virtual economy" hypothesis is correct and managers voluntarily choose barter over other means of transacting, then we should see the incidence of quasi-money more or less uniformly distributed across different industries.
14 In this paper we show that barter is concentrated in industries which are removed from the final customer (machine building and other heavy industry branches); industries which consequently have less direct access to cash. The exception to this rule is the metals and non-ferrous metals sectors which export a considerable fraction of their total production for hard currency and thus have relatively good access to liquid assets. Given Russia's under-developed banking system, firms without direct access to cash have resorted to barter and other non-monetary transactions to sustain themselves. The 13 Data in Figure 1 are from Russian Economic Barometer and were provided by John Littwak from OECD and were updated by data generously provided by Sergei Tsuklo at IET. Data in figure 2 were provided by IET. Both sources use a survey of several hundred Russian enterprises to generate their results. 14 Commander and Mumssen (1998) , based on survey of over 300 enterprises, provide substantial evidence suggesting that barter is the result of lack of liquidity in the system, and is not preferred by managers as would be expected under the "virtual economy" hypothesis. Linz and Krueger (1998, is, barter transactions and other forms of quasi-money are employed when cash is difficult to obtain.
Third, we challenge not only the assumption that managers seek to avoid restructuring, but also its related counterpart -that the "restructuring avoidance" objective is widely shared among Russian managers.
Our findings indicate that when managers are unconstrained in terms of access to cash, they generally respond aggressively to whatever opportunities are present; when liquidity constraints are binding, the scope of restructuring activities is restricted. Moreover, we find that the magnitude of the restructuring response, holding access to cash constant, depends in large part on managerial characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 develops the argument that barter and the use of non-monetary instruments is closely related to an absence of liquidity. Section 3 uses firm-level data to show that enterprise use of barter varies widely across industries and is associated with a firm's access to direct sources of cash. We view this result as important in that it indicates that Russian managers are not, generally speaking, averse to restructuring per se, they just need the opportunity to do so and when given the opportunity, like most self-interested people, they generally take it. We also show that, despite anecdotes to the contrary, barter prices are not outrageously distorted relative to cash prices, suggesting that barter and quasi-money are not being used by managers as a means of deception, but is the result of limited access to liquidity. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Explaining Variations in the Aggregate Level of Barter
We start from the premise that the choice of mechanism to complete a particular transaction is analogous to choosing a financial asset. From this perspective, barter transactions fare rather poorly vis-a-vis more liquid alternatives: (1) barter transactions are more costly than cash transactions to conduct; (2) barter transactions have a highly uncertain return because enforcement of barter agreements depends upon trust and a whole chain of associated transactions in order to obtain the anticipated return. When set against the advantages of cash, barter appears to be a strictly inferior asset: (1) cash transactions provide low risk and a high degree of certainty with respect to return, and (2) an individual cash transaction is less costly to complete. Moreover, not only have the advantages of access to cash in Russia's transition economy been substantial (Millar 1999) , cash retains significant tax avoidance advantages, although perhaps not fully commensurate with barter in this dimension. In most dimensions, a cash transaction would be strictly preferred to a barter transaction. This observation is supported by the response patterns of Russian managers (see Table 2 ).
Do Russian managers choose barter transactions to preserve the network capital which they inherited from the Soviet era? If so, then we should see the level of barter in the economy at the beginning of the transition to be relatively high and perhaps to diminish overtime. In addition to reporting the share of barter transactions each month, firms which participate in the IET surveys are asked about past trends and expected trends in the share of barter transactions. As seen in Table 3 increase. The fact that 50-60% of the manufacturing firms participating in the monthly surveys neither experienced nor expected a change in the volume of barter transactions may be interpreted as evidence of a structural problem in the Russian economy which businesses do not think will be fixed in the short term.
Consequently, they have come to view barter transactions as "normal." 16 Alternatively, it may reflect firms'
perceptions of the instability of the economy: firms experiencing a decline in barter transactions do not expect it to last -the "current down" is greater than the "expected down" in almost every month.
A second element which the VEH does not address, and would have difficulty explaining, is the fact that the incidence of barter varies significantly across major industrial branch. Both Table 1 In each case (January, April, July, and October), 40% of the respondents selected "normal;" about 10% viewed the current volume of barter transactions as "below normal." 
Source: Institute for Economy in Transition (IET)
Evident in Figure 2 is the low share of barter in the electric energy, metals and food processing industries. Chemicals, machinery, wood products, building materials and light industry all report a significantly higher incidence of barter over the five year period. Using the 51 observations from 1996 to 2001, we regress the share of barter in total transactions, that is, the incidence of barter trades, on two independent variables: a dummy variable to account for the 1998 financial crisis and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the branch was food, metals or non-ferrous metals. This specification explains 68 percent of the variation in the incidence of barter and predicts an 8.5 percent lower share of barter for firms in the food processing, metals or non-ferrous metals industries (t-statistic = -2.67).
17 These results are consistent with in-depth interviews we conducted with hundreds of Russian managers over the past seven years: industry variation in the incidence of barter transactions coincides with access to cash and other liquid assets in the economy. While the VEH makes no clear prediction concerning the pattern of barter by industrial branch, these data support the hypothesis that barter is more prevalent when firms are liquidity constrained.
18
17 The probability that this coefficient is zero is approximately 1%.
18 See Krueger (1995 Krueger ( , 2002 forthcoming), Linz and Krueger (1998) . If illiquidity is the primary cause of barter in Russia, then we should find a significant correlation between the incidence of barter and changes in the overall level of liquidity in the economy. One common measure of liquidity is the ratio of claims of the banking sector on the non-financial sector relative to GDP.
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While this ratio is widely regarded as an appropriate indicator of liquidity, the requisite Russian data are available only on a quarterly basis, which severely reduces the number of observations for our analysis.
Nonetheless, using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics, we calculated the ratio of claims on the non-financial sector to GDP for Russia from 1993 to the first quarter of 2001. After converting the monthly barter data to quarterly data, we examined the relationship between the liquidity measure and barter incidence.
We hypothesize that the responsiveness of barter to liquidity operates with a lag. 20 We use regression analysis to estimate the quarterly incidence of barter as a function of our liquidity measure, the relative share of credit available to manufacturing firms (see Figure 3) . Our results indicate that the optimal explanatory power of liquidity occurs at a lag of 2-2.5 years (8-10 quarters). Using a lag of 8 quarters, the univariate regression explains approximately 50 percent of the variation in the incidence of barter (measured quarterly); each 1 percent increase in liquidity is estimated to reduce barter by approximately 4.5 percent.
21
19 See the OECD 1997 Report on the Russian Federation which provides a comparison of liquidity among several transition economies. 20 The assumption of a lag coincides with observed monetary phenomena in market economies, where changes in liquidity are only evident after several months. In the Russian economy, where financial and other markets are less developed, the lag is likely to be longer than in a developed market economy. Our reasoning for the lag is based in large part on the realities associated with production and contract agreements in Russia: managers make deals today for delivery in the future (3-6 months, for example); liquidity conditions today govern the actual (future) transaction. We employ a moving average to filter out "noise" in the liquidity conditions because we think that managers do not respond to monthly fluctuations in liquidity if they do not think the condition will persist. The moving average captures the longer run (more persistent) signal of the liquidity conditions in the economy, and it is this signal that we believe managers utilize in their decisions. 60.00 1 9 9 3 Q 4 1 9 9 4 Q 3 1 9 9 5 Q 2 1 9 9 6 Q 1 1 9 9 6 Q 4 1 9 9 7 Q 3 1 9 9 8 Q 2 1 9 9 9 Q 1 1 9 9 9 Q 4 2 0 0 0 Q 3 period While the hypothesis that barter is the result of low levels of liquidity is supported by these results, the sample size is small and the dependent variable may be non-stationary. Our second measure of liquidity is the real effective exchange rate, that is, the ruble-dollar exchange rate adjusted for inflation in Russia.
Exchange rate data are reported weekly. Constructing a monthly exchange rate average allows us to utilize the monthly barter data, thus increasing the number of observations available for our analysis by a factor of four. The real effective exchange rate should mirror the level of liquidity in the economy, although the coefficient estimate will be opposite in sign relative to credit to the non-financial sector. 22 Initial regressions using the real effective exchange rate averaged over 16 months as the independent variable explained roughly 22 High rates coincide with a "shortage" of currency; low rates coincide with a "surplus" of currency. We hypothesized that the over-prediction was likely caused by the dramatic increase in the world market price of oil after 1999, which in turn caused an appreciation in the exchange rate while simultaneously providing liquidity to the economy through increased government revenues. 24 When we included the monthly oil price in the regression, the explanatory power rose to 83 percent, substantially reducing the prediction error after 1999 (see Figure 4) . Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the exchange rate and oil price variables are significant and have the correct sign. 25 In sum, our finding is that the incidence of barter is inversely related to liquidity, regardless of the liquidity measure used. Mar-96
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The most recent variation of the VEH argues that the central issue is neither the incidence nor the volume of barter transactions among Russian manufacturing firms, but rather the cross subsidization from the energy sector to the value-subtracting sector, that is, Russian industry (Gaddy and Ickes 2000) . In this iteration of the VEH, the authors argue that we should not be surprised at the decrease in barter as measured to an overall level of barter at 40 percent of GDP, down from the 50 percent peak in mid-1998. Actual data (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ) indicate a much larger decline: barter transactions fall to roughly 10 percent.
Moreover, if devaluation is the only force driving Russia's current expansion we should see a one-time positive shock to GDP (given an appropriate adjustment period), and then a return to the former trend;
essentially, zero real growth. The actual situation is much different: real GDP growth in Russia is apparent for three years after the August 1998 devaluation. 26 These two outcomes -a significantly larger decline in barter and the apparently sustained growth in the economy -suggest that the VEH's underlying assumptions of managerial behavior, particularly the assumption that firms actively seek to avoid restructuring, are no longer correct (if, in fact, they ever were).
The final component of our macro-level analysis focuses on the nature of the cross-subsidization from the energy sector to the rest of the economy. A recent report by the research office of Russia's AlphaBank documents the bulk of subsidies from Gazprom and UES going to the communal housing sector, not industry. Their data indicate that industry receives less than half the subsidy allocated to the housing.
27
Indeed, the authors conclude that financing the communal housing sector, not subsidizing industry, constitutes the major stumbling block to reform.
In contrast to the VEH, we find considerable and compelling evidence at the macro level in support of the liquidity hypothesis as the primary cause of barter in Russia. Additionally, we find barter varies significantly at the industry level according to differentials in liquidity. In the next section, we utilize firmlevel data to investigate in greater detail the relative importance of liquidity constraints in explaining barter transactions among Russian firms.
Barter transactions among Russian firms: descriptive and empirical analysis
Explanations for the widespread incidence of barter transactions among Russian manufacturing firms fall into two categories: choice and circumstance. Those viewing barter transactions as a choice made by managers focus on the way in which barter transactions can be used to avoid taxes, divert profits, conserve cash, price discriminate, and delay restructuring (Gaddy and Ickes 1998 , Guriev and Ickes 1999 , Guriev and Kvassov 2001 , Woodruff 1999 . Those viewing barter transactions as forced upon the firm by circumstances associated with the transition focus on: (1) the economic disorganization caused by the dismantling of the planned economy, the collapse of production chains and disruptions in supplier-customer relationships, as well as by the lack of an appropriate legal system (Blanchard and Kremer 1997, Carlin et al 2000 , Ellingsen 1998 , Hendley et al 1998 , Marin and Schnitzer 1999 , Polterovich 1997 ; (2) liquidity constraints caused by high inflation, delayed government payments for goods delivered and services rendered, and an underdeveloped banking structure (Commander and Mumssen 1998 , Brana and Maurel 1999 , Guriev, Makarov and Maurel 2000 , Hendley et al 1998 , Linz and Krueger 1998 ; and (3) the Soviet legacy of price formation, 28 profit confiscation, and reciprocal obligations (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, Makarov 28 Despite price liberalization in January 1992, tax authorities continued to use cost-plus pricing in their determination of the tax obligations of firms. Firms had no incentive to sell at a price lower than the price specified by tax authorities, because the tax obligation was based on the cost-plus price. Given the high proportion of specific fixed costs (social infrastructure, surplus labor and equipment, for example), reducing output resulted in an increase in the average cost of production, and thus price. Firms found it difficult to find buyers at the designated price (cost plus profit markup), but could neither lower price nor declare bankruptcy (shut down). Consequently, firms turned to barter transactions, it is argued, to avoid the designated price and corresponding tax obligation.
and Kleiner 1999 , Rodionov 1999 , Shcherbakov and Chernavskii 1998 , Woodruff 1999 proposition (see Appendix A for description of participating firms). To enhance comparability with the analysis conducted in the Section 2, however, the results presented here will focus on the responses of the seventy-nine manufacturing firms which participated in the survey.
Barter Transactions: Survey Results
Nearly half of the manufacturing firms participating in the 2001 survey reported engaging in barter transactions. The incidence varied by industry: more than two-thirds of the firms in heavy industry reported engaging in barter transactions compared to only 25 percent of the light industry firms. Seven of the eleven 29 Barter transactions are not new to enterprise managers in Russia's transition economy. Above-plan production in the Soviet economy frequently traded between firms in barter arrangements (Berliner 1957 1976 , Gregory and Stuart 1986 . Moreover, persistent and pervasive shortages in the Soviet economy required the establishment of barter trade between firms (horizontal linkages) to obtain the requisite materials that the planning authorities (vertical linkages) failed to deliver. Makarov and Kleiner (1996) estimate that 2-6% of the transactions between firms prior to perestroika were barter transactions established by the firms themselves in order to smooth out plan fulfillment. In many instances, local party officials acted as a clearinghouse for barter transactions, thereby reducing the time and energy required to establish a "double coincidence of wants." Nesterovich (2000) estimates that between 1985 and 1990, the acute scarcity of goods and materials generated during perestroika increased barter transactions to at least 35% of all sales.
30 Hendley et al (1997) argue that barter transactions enable firms to evade taxes. If firms inflate the barter price, driving up the cost of obtaining inputs, their profits and thus their tax obligation is reduced. To the extent that taxes are based on revenues, the seller would be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, and the deal would be concluded only if the firms held unequal bargaining power. Barter transactions may facilitate tax evasion to the extent that barter enables firms to avoid the banking system. Banks act as an intermediary for tax collection -money deposited in the firm's bank account is automatically reduced by the amount of the firm's tax obligations. Without banks, barter transactions (trading goods for goods) may incur less risk than cash as a means of payment -handling large sums of money carries with it a very real element of danger in Russia. Finally, barter transactions (tax offsets) enable firms to evade their tax obligations -over-value goods in exchange for tax payment, with side payment to tax authority who signs off on the over-valuation.
responding firms in construction materials reported conducting barter trades, as did ten of the nineteen food processing firms.
The manufacturing firms participating in this survey estimated that on average barter accounted for nearly 20% of their total transactions. However, the percent of barter in total transactions also varied by industry. Machine building and other heavy industry firms, on average, report about 30 percent of their total transactions involve barter. For consumer goods, food processing and construction materials, the average percentage is less than 20 percent.
Managers who reported engaging in barter transactions in 2001were asked to compare barter prices with cash prices. Contrary to arguments presented in the literature where barter prices are hypothesized as being higher than cash prices in order to reduce the firm's profitability and thereby reduce the firm's tax burden, few firms participating in this survey paid or received higher prices for goods involved in barter transactions. 31 The majority (54%) responded that barter prices were the same as cash prices; 40% reported paying or receiving lower barter prices. On average, barter prices were 6% lower than cash prices among the manufacturing firms participating in this survey.
When asked to give examples of barter transactions, managers most often described trading their final product to firms supplying them with raw materials. 32 An ongoing "double coincidence of wants" may account for the slightly higher incidence of barter transactions among the construction materials and food 31 Only 5% of the manufacturing firms and 10% of the non-manufacturing firms that engaged in barter transactions and who responded to this question (n = 35, n= 40, respectively) reported barter prices higher than cash prices.
32 Firms producing items used in residential and non-residential construction traded their production to firms supplying them with raw materials (timber, metals), as well as with firms which produced wood-working or other machinery. Food processing firms describe trading oil for sunflower seed, for example. Barter trade with suppliers was not limited to food processing and construction materials, however. Firms producing packaging materials traded their plastic and cardboard products to firms supplying them with raw materials. An aviation company trades technical services for spare parts; stevedores take payment in consumer goods or construction materials from the containers they loaded or unloaded.
processing firms participating in this survey -more than half engaged in barter transactions 33 barter transactions by Russian firms: that is, 43% of the firms offering a second explanation described how barter transactions reduced or replaced cash tax payments. In most instances, however, respondents were 33 53% of the food processing firms and 60% of the construction materials firms reported engaging in barter transactions. 34 Within the past year, barter trade accounted for an average of 18% of the total transactions among the food processing firms and an average of 17% of the total transactions among the construction materials firms, compared to 19% for the other manufacturing firms participating in the survey. While none of the food processing firms participating in the survey reported barter transactions exceeding 25%, construction materials firms reported up to 40% of their transactions involved barter trades. 35 The response patterns of the manufacturing firms compared to the non-manufacturing firms participating in the survey are different only in terms of relative magnitude: (1) both identified lack of cash as the main reason for barter transactions more often than any other explanation (59% and 46%, respectively), (2) both had higher profits (lower prices) and tax avoidance as the next most often cited cause of barter, but 23% of the non-manufacturing firms in comparison to 13% of the manufacturing firms described higher profits/lower prices, while an equal percentage (~12%) cited tax avoidance. 36 The question asked respondents to select the relative importance in explaining barter transactions of the following 3 options: buyers/firms have no money, avoid tax payments, obtain goods to get cash for wage payments.
describing tax offsets (zachety) rather than a transaction which involved trading goods for goods as a mechanism to lower their tax burden.
In-depth interviews conducted with several managers in summer 2001 reveal not only a lower reliance on barter in 2001 in comparison to previous years, but also less complicated barter trades.
Previously, descriptions of barter transactions involved multiple firms, and frequently, at least two of the firms involved in the barter chain were unrelated in any production sense to either the original buying and/or selling firms. For example, barter trades by firms producing steel pipes or large capacity boilers would include transactions in the barter chain which would enable the pipe or boiler firm to acquire goods that could be sold for cash or used to pay workers (Linz 2000a (Linz , 2000b . This past summer, however, unilateral trades (a swap of materials for final product) were the norm among the barter trades described by the firms participating in this survey.
At the end of the interview, managers were asked to respond to a generic question about the incidence of barter transactions among Russian firms. That is, managers were asked for their opinion about possible changes in the incidence of barter transactions among Russian firms over the course of the current year. 37 More than 8-in-10 (84%) anticipated no change in the incidence of barter transactions; the remainder expected barter transactions to decline over the course of 2001.
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Barter and Firm Liquidity
Do barter transactions vary with the liquidity position of the firm? In our analysis, one dependent 37 Respondents were asked: In your view, what will happen to the number of barter deals between firms in Russia this year; will barter trades ____ increase ____ remain the same ____ decrease 38 In an effort to check the consistency of responses related to barter trades, managers of non-manufacturing firms were asked to identify the percent of their transactions with suppliers that involved each of the following: (1) money now, product later; (2) product now, money later; (3) money now, product now; and (4) product now traded for product now or later. Of those responding, 70% of the transactions were reported as requiring money payment (an average of 54%) in advance of receiving the product (this coincides with the response patterns to a separate set of questions about prepayment); 19% reported that between 5% and 30% of their transactions involved barter (product for product). This response pattern does coincide with a lower incidence of barter trades conducted by the nonmanufacturing firms participating in this survey.
variable focuses on whether or not the firm engages in barter trade; 39 a second focuses on the percentage of barter in total transactions.
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Several questions in the survey instrument addressed the liquidity position of the firm: whether the firm earned profits in the current or previous year (82% said yes), whether the firm borrowed money in the past two years to cover operating expenses or to pay wages (22% reported borrowing to finance working capital, 10% borrowed to finance wage payments), whether the firm borrowed from the bank in the past two years (10% said yes), whether the firm borrowed from private individuals or other business organizations in the past two years (26% said yes), whether the firm faces prepayment obligations (73% said yes), whether the firm sees its current financial position as improving (35% said yes), 41 and whether the firm selects "firm's lack of money" or "customers' lack of money" as the main obstacle to doing business (97% and 95%, respectively). 42 In addition to these liquidity variables, we hypothesize that liquidity is highly correlated with particular industries. That is, while manufacturing firms tend to sell the majority of their output to wholesalers or retailers rather than to final consumers, 43 industries that are closest to the cash sales of final consumers (food processing, construction materials, consumer goods/light industry, for example) are less likely to face liquidity constraints than machine building firms which sell their product to other firms.
Consequently, we hypothesize that while the incidence of barter among firms in industries that are close to 43 Prior to 1992, it was common for manufacturing firms to have a retail shop on their premises which sold the company's products directly to consumers. This practice has not been entirely disbanded, but with the growing multitude of well-stocked retail shops, consumers no longer need to travel to the company to purchase its product.
final consumers (cash sales) may not necessarily be significantly lower, 44 the volume of barter transactions by firms in these industries will be lower.
We first analyze the incidence of barter transactions among manufacturing firms participating in the survey, hypothesizing that the incidence of barter is inversely related to the firm's liquidity position. In the first specification, whether or not the firm borrowed to be able to pay wages is used as a proxy for the firm's liquidity position. Since firms can use trade credits or other non-monetary instruments to pay suppliers, one measure of the cash position of the firm is whether it must borrow money to pay wages. OLS regression results indicate that firms which borrowed money to pay wages were significantly more likely to engage in barter transactions. Conversely, we hypothesized that firms which were able to pay above-average wages would be less likely to engage in barter. OLS regression results substantiate this proposition: wages and barter are inversely related.
In the third specification, the prepayment requirement is used as a proxy for the liquidity position of the firm. We hypothesize that firms which face prepayment requirements are more likely to engage in barter.
If prepayment requires cash, this reduces the firm's liquidity, causing the firm to engage in barter.
Alternatively, barter trade may be used to satisfy the prepayment requirement (if the firm faces a cash constraint). OLS regression results substantiate the proposition that prepayment and barter are directly related: the prepayment coefficient is positive and significant.
The three different measures we used to capture the firm's liquidity position all generate the same outcome with regard to barter: firms with less access to cash are more likely to engage in barter transactions.
Additional support for this finding that barter is more likely when cash constraints are encountered is found when industry is used as a proxy for liquidity. That is, when the percent of barter transactions is used as the dependent variable in a univariate regression with a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in heavy industry, the results indicate that, ceteris paribus, heavy industry firms (machine building firms, for example) engage in a significantly higher volume of barter transactions than the other firms participating in this survey.
45
45 With 69 observations used in the regression, the coefficient on the industry dummy variable is .1245, with a tstatistic of 3.02, significant at the 1% level.
In contrast to the "virtual economy" hypothesis, our results point unambiguously to the role of liquidity in explaining both the incidence and volume of barter transactions. We find no support for the proposition that barter transactions are used to avoid restructuring. Instead, we find managers using barter to obtain necessary materials, trading their final product for these inputs. It is not the case, however, that these barter trades are exclusively with suppliers from the Soviet era; that is, managers are not relying on network capital established in the Soviet economy to maintain current operations.
In contrast to the "virtual economy" hypothesis, 46 Empirical analyses of enterprise restructuring tend to focus on the impact of privatization on various performance indicators: change in volume or assortment of production (Earle and Telegdy 1998 , Estrin and Rosevear 1999 , Jones 1998 , Linz 1997 , Linz and Krueger 1998 and/or employment (Bilsen and Konings 1998, Linz 2001) , volume of domestic and foreign sales (Buck et al 1999) , and profitability (Duflo and Senik-Leygonie 1997) . Numerous studies focus on the nature of the ownership structure: insiders versus outsiders, blockholders, foreign investors (Aghion and Blanchard 1996 , Anderson et al 1997 , as well as managerial turnover (Barberis et al 1996 , Claessens and Djankov 1999 , Frydman et al 1998 , Linz 1996 , Roland and Sekkat 2000 and mechanisms used to select managers. A few studies focus on the extent to which competition has an effect on improving enterprise performance (Brown and Brown 1998 , Earle and Estrin 1998 , Brown and Earle 2000 .
Summary and Conclusions
We use macro-level and micro-level data to document the link between liquidity and barter in Russian industry. In doing so, we demonstrate that neither the assumptions nor the outcomes associated with the "virtual economy" interpretation of Russia are grounded in reality. Rather, the issue we identify is the low level of liquidity in Russia's economy, which needs far more attention from analysts. Low liquidity levels in Russia are the direct consequence of unreliable contract and legal enforcement which works directly to reduce the supply of credit in the economy. As we identified in a previous paper (Linz and Krueger 1998) , we see this problem as the challenge for Russia's economy in its efforts to achieve normalcy.
What is to be done? If, as Millar (2001) argues, "the transition proper is over ... what we are viewing ... in the former Soviet Union is 'normal' economic, political, and social change" (p. 2), perhaps it is time to reconsider the underlying premise in the restructuring literature that "winners" are firms which mimic their capitalist counterparts, and since little evidence is apparent that Russian firms engage in comparable behavior, they are all "losers." If the transition is over, and Russia has "gotten stuck half way to a normal functioning economy" (Millar 2001, p. 4) , the task before us is to construct research questions and design research projects which incorporate this reality. Like Alice, when confronted with Wonderland, we need to extend our analysis of Russia's current economic conditions to include viable options, such as the role of barter transactions in facilitating the restructuring process, 47 rather than to summarily disregard these options. 
Share of Barter in Total Sales (%)
Retail Shops
Owners or top-level managers of 122 retail shops participated in the interview project. Of these, 40 were located in Moscow, 52 in Taganrog, 10 in Rostov, and 20 in Vladivostok. The participating firms employed, on average, 43 workers, and operated, on average, in 4 locations. 53 The retail shops participating in this survey included 30 firms reporting sales dominated by food items, 40 firms reporting sales dominated by alcohol, tobacco products and candy, and 26 firms selling various consumer goods (clothing, video equipment, cosmetics, household items and souvenirs, for example).
The retail shop respondents were asked whether the company earned a profit in the first year of operations: 84% responded affirmatively. When asked about the percent of profit re-invested in the firm, the responses ranged from 2% to 100%, with a mean of 42%. When asked how their current financial position compares with the previous year, responses were equally split between "better" and "the same." There was significant regional variation in the response patterns: retail shops in Moscow and Vladivostok were much less likely to say "better" than their counterparts in Rostov and Taganrog.
To capture changes in consumer preferences, 54 respondents were asked about the percent of the shop's current merchandise that was made in Russia, and how that figure compares to 1998. Retail shops report that, on average, 68% of their current merchandise was made in Russia, and 77% of the retail shops report that the proportion of Russian-made goods nowadays is greater (higher) than what the shop offered in 1998. There was no significant variation in response patterns by region with regard to these results.
The retail shops participating in this study were in agreement about what needs to be done to improve economic and business conditions in Russia: reduce taxes, improve the laws and legal system, and stabilize the economy at a level of operation that generates a higher income for the average worker.
Manufacturing Firms
Of the 79 manufacturing plants participating in the project, 41 were located in Taganrog (52%), 22 in Rostov (28%), 2 in Azov, and 14 in Vladivostok. One-third of the firms were engaged in the production of consumer goods (light industry), employing an average of 150 workers; one-quarter were food processing plants, employing an average of 457 workers. Producers of construction materials accounted for 13% of the firms and employed an average of 286 workers; 4% of the firms produced machinery and equipment (heavy industry), employing on average 1367 workers. The majority of firms reported their ownership structure as 53 Among retail shops in Moscow, average workforce size was 28 employees; in Taganrog, 59 employees; in Rostov, 58 employees, and in Vladivostok, 10 employees. Retail shops in Moscow, on average, operated in 2 locations; in Taganrog, in 5 locations; in Rostov, in 3 locations, and in Vladivostok, in 4 locations. 54 At the beginning of the transition process, various market students indicate that Russian consumers reported preferring non-Russian goods (see Huddleston and Good 1996, BISNIS October 2001) . Shops were stocked almost exclusively with imported goods from 1993-1997. Since the financial crisis in August 1998, shelves appear to encompass a greater portion of Russian-made goods. This study attempted to identify the share of Russian-made products which retail shops tend to stock (sell). joint stock (46%) or limited liability (44%).
On average, the participating manufacturing firms paid 2010 rubles per month, with food processing firms paying 2233 rubles per month, construction materials firms paying 2230 per month, heavy industry firms paying 2100 per month, and light industry firms paying 1964 per month. Among the food processing plants, average wages were highest in Vladivostok (4375 rubles), with firms in Rostov paying 2200 rubles per month. Food processing plants in Taganrog paid an average of 1490 rubles per month. Two-thirds of the manufacturing firms participating in this project leased the buildings in which their company operated (among food processing plants, only 11% reported leasing their facilities). Among those reporting ownership of the buildings in which their company operated, 58% were located in Taganrog, 27% in Rostov, and 12% in Vladivostok.
Just over one-quarter of the participating manufacturing firms reported plans for renovating their plant during the current year. On average, these firms report needing to replace 40% of their capital stock and 13% of their workers.
Other Service Sector Firms
Many of the 63 non-retail firms participating in this survey were involved in wholesale trade or repair work. Average wages paid by these firms ranged from 1463 rubles per month in Taganrog to 4052 rubles per month in Vladivostok. These firms employed an average of 78 workers, and were equally split between owning (50%) and leasing (50%) the facilities in which their company operated.
